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Differences in Technology Transfers to China Among European 
and Japanese Elevator Companies∗ 
Junko Mizuno 
     
  
This report analyzes technology transfers and education for local engineers within 
overseas subsidiaries of Japanese and European companies that have advanced into 
China, and examines differences among them. Based on the assumption that if the 
quality of trained local engineers is different, the international division of labor is also 
different, I aim to clarify how they are different. 
Stating the conclusion at the outset, the local engineers nurtured in overseas 
subsidiaries of Japanese companies have mid-level skills similar to those of Japanese 
engineers at a holding company. There is thus a duplication of skills between the local 
engineers with mid-level skills and Japanese engineers at a holding company. When 
Japanese holding companies succeed in fostering local engineers, of course, there is a 
beneficial effect both for the overseas subsidiary and for the technical development of 
local engineers. However, these benefits may also help rivals.  
In comparison, overseas subsidiaries of European companies foster low-level 
engineers, and the division of labor with engineers at a holding company is a 
complementary relation, without duplication. 
 
 
1. Issues of Discussion 
This investigation began from the following critical questions. In the past, people in 
East and Southeast Asian countries including South Korea, Taiwan, and mainland 
China have criticized the technology transfers of Japanese holding companies, as 
follows. “Japanese holding companies are reluctant to offer technologies in comparison 
                                            
∗ This is a translation of a report published in Japanese in the October 2006 
issue of Ajiken warudo torendo [Ajiken world trend]. 
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with European holding companies,” “Japanese technology transfers are slow in 
comparison with those of European companies,” and “the technologies offered from 
Japan are not new ones,” “Because the unit price of Japanese technologies is cheap in 
comparison with those from Europe.” 
However, in the case of South Korea, for example, the machine tools industry 
has developed based on imported technologies from Japan1. Moreover, some South 
Korean machine tools makers have become competitors of Japanese firms2. 
In addition, in the case of the automotive industry, Hyundai Motors and Kia 
Motors, which imported technologies from Japan, had higher levels of technologies 
than Daewoo Motors, which imported technologies from GM. After the economic crisis 
in 1997, Hyundai and Kia both survived. However, Daewoo, which had no technologies 
of its own, went bankrupt and a buyer did not readily appear. 
In spite of this situation, however, the “knowledge” that Japan has failed to 
transfer technologies to Asia has become commonsense not only in East and Southeast 
Asian countries but also among social scientists in Japan. 
 This report analyzes the contradiction that East and Southeast Asian 
countries receiving technologies from Japan, which is said to have been a failure in the 
area of technology transfers, have grown economically, and aims to give the answers.  
Therefore, I begin by examining two items of erroneous commonsense, first, that 
“European holding companies provide technologies but Japanese ones are reluctant to 
do so,” and second, that “European holding companies transfer the technologies quickly, 
but Japanese ones do so slowly.” In fact, this report finds that Japanese holding 
companies train local engineers to mid-level skills, and as a result, sometimes makes 
the engineers rivals. 
                                            
1 Mizuno, Junko. 1990. “Kankoku kousaku kikai kougyou no hatten youin 
[Development factors of the machine tool industry in the Republic of Korea]” AJIA 
KEIZAI, vol.XXXI No.4.April. 29-31. 
2 Hachiga, Soichi; Mizuno, Junko. 2003. “Oiageru kankoku no kousaku kikai 
sangyou [The Korean machine tool industry: In hot pursuit]” In Ajia no Kanagata 
Kosakukikai Sangyo: Rokaraizudo Gurobarizumu-ka no Bijinesu Dezain [Asian Die 
and Mold and Machine tool Industries: business Design under Localized Globalism] 
ed. Mizuno. Chiba. IDE-JETRO. 
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2. Type of Industry Examined 
In order to examine the two elements of erroneous commonsense, it is necessary to 
compare the same products from the same industry among overseas subsidiaries of 
Japanese and European companies. It would not be proper to compare overseas 
subsidiaries producing different types of products in different industries.   
The data used in this paper are the findings from the elevator (lift) industry. 
This industry was selected because its products have to be designed with very reliable 
technologies, since they transport persons and move as do cars and trains. In this 
connection, when elevators are exported from Japan to a developed nation, there is 
generally a requirement for a certificate attesting to the technical career and skills of 
the design superintendent. 
In addition, elevators are produced based on orders, and each product has to 
be customized for a specific building, creating a need for many product design 
engineers. Therefore, the elevator industry is an appropriate type of industry for 
investigating the state of technology transfers. 
In addition, the elevator industry is one area of the machine sector where 
overseas advances took place comparatively early. This is because the demand for 
elevators in factories, apartment buildings and hotels emerges in the early stages of a 
country’s industrialization. Therefore, taking the elevator industry as a case study can 
be useful as a precedent for other machine industries. 
 Another good reason for selecting the elevator industry as the object of 
investigation is that eight of the world’s main elevator companies, including four 
Japanese companies, three European ones and one American one, have advanced 
into China and are competing for the Chinese domestic market. Because there are only 
eight main companies, obtaining information from more than five companies makes it 
possible to generalize the results of the survey. 
 
3. Investigation Sample 
The investigation was carried out using the visiting-hearing method, and an identical 
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questionnaire was given to the elevator companies from Japan and from Europe and 
the United States.  
Three overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies and two overseas 
subsidiaries of European companies agreed to cooperate with the investigation. Two of 
these overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies were makers of completed products, 
while the third subsidiary was a maker of major parts, with plans to become a maker 
of completed products. One of the two full product makers filled out the questionnaire, 
but did not agree to a visit. 
On the other hand, two of the four overseas subsidiaries of European 
companies agreed to cooperate with the investigation. Both produce completed 
products. 
Because the questionnaires included the many questions on details, none of 
the companies replied to all of the questions. Under a situation where companies are 
competing in the same market, they worry about leaking information to rivals, and 
typically are reluctant to answer all questions. As a result, there were some questions 
that were answered by only one overseas subsidiary. 
 
3.1. Periods of Advance into China of the Surveyed Companies 
It was after the middle of the 1990s that the three Japanese holding companies 
advanced into China. The average year for the advance of the three companies is 
calculated to be 1996. 
 In comparison, European holding companies began their advances in the first 
half of the 1980s, more than a decade earlier than their Japanese counterparts. As a 
result, they had already finished the technology transfers by the time the Japanese 
firms moved into the market. Consequently, the persons who had been charge during 
that period were no longer serving in the same positions. 
 One person from each of the two European advance companies cooperated 
with the investigation. One was a manager at the overseas subsidiaries, and the other 
was an engineer from the holding company in charge of technological guidance.  
On the other hand, at the overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies, there 
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were Japanese engineers who had been involved in technological guidance from the 
beginning and who were still playing an important role. In these overseas subsidiaries 
of Japanese companies, I was able to obtain information on the initial period of the 
advance, demonstrating a major difference with the overseas subsidiaries of European 
firms. 
The managers and engineers dispatched from two Japanese holding 
companies answered the questionnaires at the same time, in great detail. 
 
3.2. Investment Ratio of the Holding Companies 
The investment forms of the five companies can be divided into joint investment forms 
and wholly (100%) owned forms. Of the three overseas subsidiaries of Japanese 
companies, two are joint enterprises where the Japanese side holds a majority of 
equity, and the third is a wholly-owned investment, with the Japanese side holding 
100% of equity. 
One Japanese joint venture subsidiary is working with a Chinese elevator 
company. The other Japanese joint venture subsidiary is working with a Chinese 
company that is not related to the elevator industry. 
On the other hand, the two overseas subsidiaries of European companies 
have both adopted fully-owned investment forms. However, they did not adopt this 
form at the outset. In the beginning period, they both took the form of joint ventures. 
During the period when they made their investments, the Chinese government 
required them to be joint venture forms with a Chinese partner, for example the 
Chinese ministry of construction, which has an elevator company. Because the Chinese 
government lacked experience with joint ventures, however, there were many complex, 
opaque elements. Later on, 100% investment by foreign capital was accepted by the 
Chinese government. One of the overseas subsidiaries of European companies bought 
stocks from the local company in 2001 and made it a fully-owned subsidiary. During 
the time of the joint management form, the overseas subsidiary of European company 
was a joint enterprise with a minority stake. 
At that time, the Chinese government did not permit foreign investors to be 
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majority investors, because it aimed to use the right of management to acquire 
technologies. However, the European holding company was not able to meet the 
Chinese government’s request for technology transfers, because it thought that it 
would not be able to prevent the leakage of technologies if it only had a minority stake. 
As a result, the plans for the Chinese partner to use its management rights in the joint 
venture to absorb the technologies were not successful. 
In response to the failure, the Chinese government changed its policy to 
permit Japanese companies to advance into China and to compete for the Chinese 
market with overseas subsidiaries of European companies, in an attempt to create a 
situation where firms had no choice but to transfer technologies. 
 
3.3. Comparison of the Product Technologies Provided by the Five Holding Companies 
Elevators can be categorized by the speed of operation and weight–carrying capacity. 
This analysis distinguishes products into five levels based on the speed of operation. 
Needless to say, the technical level required for a super-high-speed elevator is higher 
than for both medium and low-speed ones. 
 Table 1 shows that the holding companies have mainly transferred technology 
for medium-speed elevators. Here, we confirm that it is valid to compare the 
technology transfers, human resources development and international division of labor 
about these five overseas subsidiaries. 
 
Categorization of Technology Level  
(1) Low-speed elevator (Less than 45 meters per minute)  
(2) Medium-speed elevator (60-105 meters per minute) 
(3) Medium high-speed elevator (120-180 meters per minute)  
(4) High-speed elevator (210-300 meters per minute)  
(5) Super-high-speed elevator (More than 300 meters per minute) 
(1) Low-speed elevators, which travel less than 45 meters per minute, are 
installed in comparatively low-rise buildings such as factories or hospitals, for the 
purpose of ensuring stability of movement.  
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Table 1. Number of Transferred Product Technologies by Company  
  Product technology J1 J2 J3 E1 E2 Total 
5 
Super-high speed elevator (More than 300 
meters per minute) 
  ○ ○   2 Companies
4 
High-speed elevator (210-300 meters per 
minute) 
  ○ ○ ○ 3 Companies
3 
Medium high-speed elevator (120-180 meters 
per minute) 
 ○ ○ ○ ○ 4 Companies
2 
Medium -speed elevator (60-105 meters per 
minute) 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 5 Companies
1 
Low-speed elevator (Less than 45 meters per 
minute) 
  ○ ○ ○ 3 Companies
 
However, because office buildings and symbolic high-rise buildings were 
being constructed in China in the beginning of the 1990’s, the demand for elevators 
was mainly for high-rise buildings. This demand later ran out. By contrast, the 
demand rose for elevators in factories, in apartment buildings with more than seven 
floors, and in middle-rise commercial buildings. 
 (2) Medium-speed elevators (60 meters to 105 meters per minute) are 
installed in commercial buildings and apartment buildings with more than seven 
floors. 
 (3) Elevators with speeds from 120 meters to 180 meters per minute are 
installed in a high-rise apartments and high-rise buildings. 
 (4) High-speed elevators with speeds from 210 meters to 300 meters per 
minute and super-high-speed elevators with speeds greater than 300 meters per 
minute are typically installed in hotels and in symbolic buildings. 
Table 1 shows that all five overseas subsidiaries have received technologies 
for medium-speed elevators (60-105 meters per minute) from holding companies. 
For the next rank, four of the overseas subsidiaries have received 
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technologies for medium-high-speed elevators (120-180 meters per minute). 
 Three overseas subsidiaries have received technologies for (1) low-speed 
elevators and for (4) high-speed elevators, whereas two have received technologies for 
(5) super-high-speed elevators. 
 All five overseas subsidiaries have mainly received technologies for 
medium-speed and medium high-speed elevators. 
These results fail to demonstrate the unbalanced technology transfers, under 
which some holding companies concentrate on technology transfers for low-speed 
elevators and others concentrate on technology transfers for high-speed elevators. It is 
found, rather, that all five holding companies transfer a very similar level of 
technologies to overseas subsidiaries. 
From this, we conclude that there are no major disparities in the product 
technologies transferred by the five holding companies. Because all five holding 
companies transferred technologies for medium-speed elevators, which have the 
largest domestic demand, the comparison of product technology transfers in this 
category can serve as a comparative study. 
 
4. Examination of the First Erroneous Commonsense: European holding companies 
provide technologies but Japanese ones are reluctant to do so 
As seen from the cross-analysis in Table 1 using the level of technologies and capital 
ties, there are clear differences in technology transfers between the form of joint 
ventures and fully-owned subsidiaries. 
Generally speaking, in any industry, fully-owned subsidiaries tend to receive 
transfers of a wider range of technologies because of the confidence that the 
technologies will not be leaked. 
 Looking at Table 1, we find that J1 and J2, which are joint ventures from 
Japan, seem at first glance to have been transferred a narrow range of product 
technologies by holding companies. By contrast, J3, E1, and E3, which are fully-owned 
subsidiaries, despite being subsidiaries from Japan and of Europe, seem to have been 
transferred a wide range of product technologies, from low-speed to super-high-speed 
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elevators. 
From Table 1, we can state that the apparent quantity of product 
technologies transferred depends not on the nationality but on the investment ratio. In 
other words, the transferred product technologies from holding companies to overseas 
subsidiaries of joint venture form are for medium-speed and high-speed elevators, 
whereas the transferred product technologies to fully-owned overseas subsidiaries are 
for a wide range of technologies from low-speed to super-high speed elevators. 
Before the WTO period, generally in East and Southeast Asia, governments 
of developing countries aiming to absorb technologies from foreign direct investment 
have adopted policies to regulate the investment ratio of foreign capital to less than 
49%, with the aim to hold management rights. For example, the South Korean 
government did not allow foreign investment, especially from Japan, to have more 
than a 49% stake, only exception being cases where technologies were recognized as 
high technologies. Therefore, almost no Japanese holding companies could have 
overseas subsidiaries with more than 51% shares. In East and Southeast Asia, 
Japanese foreign direct investments were only permitted to make 100% investments in 
extremely limited types of industry, which were approved as pioneering industries. 
Although this was not the intention of the host governments, the limitation 
to 49% of the investment created a situation where holding companies hesitated to 
transfer technologies to developing countries. 
This investigation discovered that one of the overseas subsidiaries of 
European companies, which is now a fully-owned subsidiary, was a joint venture, 
following the policy of the Chinese government, before becoming a fully-owned 
subsidiary. This overseas subsidiary of European company reported that the range of 
technologies transferred to China at the time was not as wide as at present. 
 With regard to the technology transfers, the interactions between the holding 
company and the host government begin from the question of whether the holding 
company will carry out an independent investment or be a joint venture. European 
firms seem to go as far as to enlist the support of the home government in an effort to 
get permission for 100% investment. Because the Japanese government offers 
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relatively little support in this area, Japanese firms invest as joint ventures. As a 
result, it appears on the surface that holding firms of Europe transfer a great deal 
more product technologies than their Japanese counterparts. 
Therefore, the first item of erroneous commonsense, that “European holding 
companies provide technologies but Japanese ones are reluctant to do so,” should be 
modified as follows. “Overseas subsidiaries of joint venture forms seem to receive few 
transferred technologies, but fully-owned overseas subsidiaries seem to be offered 
comparatively many.” 
Up until now, Japanese holding companies making investments in East and 
Southeast Asia have adopted not 100% investment but joint venture forms, with less 
than 49% stakes, based on the foreign investment policies of East and Southeast Asian 
host governments. 
In many East and Southeast Asian countries, and particularly South Korea 
and China, joint ventures with less than 49% stakes held by the holding companies 
were common, due to the authorization policies of the host governments. As a result, 
the quantity of technology transfers has been relatively small in this area. This, in fact, 
is the source of the misunderstanding that “Japanese holding companies are reluctant 
to transfer technologies.” 
 
5. Examination of the Second Erroneous Commonsense: “European holding companies 
transfer the technologies quickly, but Japanese ones do so slowly.”  
When making technology transfers to a developing country, the nurturing of talented 
personnel is a key. Many cases of technology transfers to developed nations begin with 
an offer of drawings and related data, but most developing countries have few 
engineers who are able to read the drawings. As a result, the technology transfers have 
to begin from the education of local engineers. 
Engineers do not come in one quality alone. There are some who have deep 
understanding of technologies, and others whose understanding is much shallower. We 
must, therefore, examine the skill level of engineers trained by the overseas 
subsidiaries. 
 11
In judging the level or quality of engineers, a clear difference in the depth of 
technological understanding can be gauged by examining whether the engineer who 
can make independent judgments or has to rely on an instruction manual. 
For reference, the quality level of machine tools engineers can be gauged as 
follows3 . 
 
Division of technical level (quality) of machine tools engineers 
(1) Shallowest level: only understands the components of a product and the 
connections between them. 
(2) Shallow level: only understands information exhibited by a drawing, and 
understands the ease of part processing, procedures for dismantling and assembling, 
and the relative difficulty. 
(3) Moderate: has understanding of the need for product compactification, grassroots 
devices for cost reduction as exhibited in drawings, but still requires considerable 
experience and knowledge. 
(4) Slightly deep level: is able to look at a drawing by two dimensions and imagine the 
three-dimensional form. 
(5) Deep level: by reading the information conveyed on the cover of a drawing (the 
negative), can get a grasp of the new device and understand the intentions of the 
original designer. 
(6) Deepest level: understands the intention of the design superintendent involved in 
the design of a product, and based on a drawing, imagine a solid object in motion. This 
                                            
3 Ito, Yoshimi; Junko Mizuno. 2005. “Kuni chiiki no sangyou gijustu no hikaku chousa 
de juuyouna bunri yuugou no kenkyuu taisei to bunseki shuhou nituite  [About 
combination study system and analysis methods among social scientists and natural 
scientists for comparative studies on technologies and on industries in a country or an 
area]. In Shien-gata sanngyou no jituryoku to saihen [Abilities and reorganization in 
supporting type of industries], ed.Saito E. Kyoto: AUN Co. Ltd. 
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involves imagining, from the drawing, the functions that the actual product will have, 
and conduct simulations and imagine dangerous parts.  
 
5.1. Methods for Training Local Engineers for Technology transfers 
One of the questions asked in this survey was what methods companies advancing into 
developing countries used to educate local engineers for technology transfers. 
Answers were prepared for multiple choice, as follows, for comparison. 
 
The answers provided were as follows: 
(1) Educating local engineers using drawings and other design documents 
(2) Educating local engineers using drawings, other design documents and extra texts 
(3) Training using OJT conducted by a local senior engineer or manager (not somebody 
dispatched from the holding company) 
(4) Training local engineers using OJT by an engineer from the holding company, 
based on a plan made in the holding company (using a manual) 
(5) Training local engineers using OJT by an engineer from the holding company 
(6) Sending a local engineer to be educated in the home country of the holding company 
or foreign firm with capital ties to it 
(7) Having, from the beginning, local engineers who have the experience to understand 
drawings, with no need to reeducate the engineers. 
 The answers are shown in Table 2. In the cases of overseas subsidiaries of 
Japanese companies, J1 and J2, methods (2) and (5) were used simultaneously. This 
shows that the companies endeavored to give the engineers both theoretical and 
practical education. They also implemented method (6) in cases when no machinery 
was available on site for training, and sent them to places where such machinery 
existed.  
 By contrast, in the case of E1, a European subsidiary company, method (6) 
was used initially. However, normally it uses method (4). It appears to be education not 
based on drawings or other materials, but rather standardized education to show the 
engineer how to work.  
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Table 2. Education of Local Engineers for Technology Transfers from Holding Companies 
  J1 J2 J3 E1 E2
6 
Sending a local engineer to be educated in the home country of 
the company or foreign firm with capital ties to it 
○ ○   ○ ○
5 
Training local engineers using OJT by an engineer from the 
holding company 
○ ○     ○
4 
Training local engineers using OJT by an engineer from the 
holding company, based on a plan made in the parent company
(using a manual) 
     ○  
3 
Training using OJT conducted by a local senior engineer or 
manager (not somebody dispatched from the parent company)
        
2 
Educating local engineers using drawings, other design 
documents and extra texts 
○ ○     ○
1 
Educating local engineers using drawings and other design 
documents 
        
 
I also asked what level of local engineers the company was hoping to train 
through the education. Respondents were asked to choose among four levels to the 
question, “What level of local engineer are you aiming for?”  
 The four levels were as follows: 
(1) The local engineer can grasp the needs of a market and can develop products 
independently (product plan level) 
(2) The local engineer has a wide range of knowledge, and can solve most problems 
(experience in designing and manufacturing engineer level) 
(3) The local engineer can understand a drawing/document and manufacturing 
processes, and can revise them to meet the local needs and suggest improvements. If 
there are instructions, the engineer can respond to them (person of general 
engineer/skill level) 
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(4) The local engineer can somehow manage to follow orders (technician level) 
 As shown in Table 3, the answer was clearly different between J1, J2 and E1. 
J1 and J2 responded that they aimed for (2), whereas E1 replied it was aiming 
for level (4). Thus, though the overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies are joint 
enterprises with the possibility of technology leaks, they are willing to invest time and 
money with the aim to bring up local engineers of a comparatively high level. By 
contrast, E1, which takes the form of a 100% investment, has little worry about 
technical leakage, but in comparison to the overseas subsidiaries of Japanese 
companies, the local engineers whom it plans to train will only be low-grade engineers.  
Because it is only aiming to develop low-grade engineers, E1 can bring them 
up in a short term. If a problem occurs on the manufacturing floor, it will bring a senior 
engineer from the holding company to solve it, using local low-class engineers. This is a 
similar system to that in the home country, where engineers are organized into 
hierarchy. 
 
Table 3. Target Level of Local Engineers 
  Levels J1 J2 J3 E1 E2
1 
The local engineer can grasp the needs of a market and can 
develop products independently (product plan level) 
  ○    
2 
The local engineer has a wide range of knowledge, and can 
solve most problems (experience in designing and 
manufacturing engineer level) 
○ ○     ○
3 
The local engineer can understand a drawing document and 
manufacturing processes, and can revise them to meet the 
local needs and suggest improvements. If there are 
instructions, the engineer can respond to them (person of 
general engineer/skill level) 
       
4 
The local engineer can somehow manage to follow orders 
(technician level) 
    ○  
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Meanwhile, I asked a question “What is the criteria for deciding when an 
engineer who has been dispatched by the holding company can return to the home 
country?” The overseas subsidiaries of European companies were not able to reply to 
this question, because it had happened in the distant past. However, I received 
answers from the overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies. 
 The following choices were offered:. 
(1) The time of completion of guidance on drawings about machinery was completed 
(2) The time of completion of guidance on drawings and of design/document including 
standards on machinery  
(3) The time of completion of guidance on drawings and design documents about 
machinery and the additional text 
(4) When the local engineers and local workers are able to manufacture the products 
with stable quality and a low defective article ratio, after the completion of guidance 
such as drawings about machinery 
(5) When simple revisions or improvements of design were possible 
(6) When it was possible to carry out design that grasped local needs  
(7) There was no dispatch of a person from the holding company 
 The overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies, which educate their local 
engineers using OJT, chose answer (4). It seems, thus, that they consider the 
technology transfers to be completed once the real production has become stable. This 
answer does not contradict the answers they gave regarding  local engineers 
education, under which an engineer from the holding company provides education in 
theory and practice in OJT to the local engineers, and returns to the home country 
after training local engineers who can “solve nearly all problems” when something 
happens . 
 Let us now summarize the differences of technology transfers between 
overseas subsidiaries of Japanese and European companies. The European system 
trains lower grade local engineers who do not go beyond the range of interpreting a 
manual, but overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies bring up intermediate-level 
local engineers who can think by themselves to solve problems, working in parallel 
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with Japanese engineers. 
 
6. Differences in the international division of labor among Japanese and European 
companies 
Next, based on the assumption that if the level (quality) of the local engineers trained 
by holding companies is different, the international division of labor must also differ, I 
will analyze how these factors differ between Japanese and European companies.  
There are four basic patterns of international division of labor: (1) division of 
labor among products, (2) division of labor among processes, (3) division of labor among 
markets, and (4) division of labor with a mixture of outsourcing, I will begin by 
explaining those basic elements 
 (1) The division of labor among products is a type where products are divided 
between, for instance, low grade and high grade ones, or low priced and high-priced 
ones. For example, a holding company may produce color television sets while an 
overseas subsidiary produces black and white television sets. 
In this case, the holding company rules the sale market, and simultaneously, 
an overseas subsidiary takes responsibility for production and quality control, so it 
must train engineers to take charge of production and quality control. 
The second category, a division of labor among processes, is one where an 
overseas subsidiary is provided with parts and components from all over the world and 
fabricates items, such as personal computers, using a supplied drawing. 
A holding company rules the sale market and divides a part of the process to 
transfer to an overseas subsidiary and train a few workers and quality control 
engineers. 
The third category, the division of labor among markets, is one where a holding 
company and an overseas subsidiary both work to meet the needs of their own 
respective users. In this case, both companies design, produce and sell based on their 
users’ needs. The markets are divided according to purpose, specification of users, 
income hierarchy, or area. 
Under this type, since the subsidiary maintains its own market, it has 
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engineers for product planning and designing. The two companies have a somewhat 
independent relationship. This pattern is commonly seen in the dies and molds 
industry. 
In the fourth category, a division of labor based on a mixture of outsourcing, the 
holding company is in charge of grasping and product planning for a market, and an 
overseas subsidiary has product design engineers. The holding company and 
subsidiary both have production and quality control engineers, and each company 
totally outsources orders to outside firms depending on cost. In other words, in this 
case, neither company produces products on its own.  
As shown by Table 1, one of the European holding companies seem to have 
provided its overseas subsidiary, E1, with production technologies from a low speed 
elevator to a super-high-speed elevator, and seems generous in offering technologies . 
However, it is actually employing one form of the division of labor among processes, 
because it does not carry out product planning or product design.  
 
Table 4. Division of Labor among Processes and Human Resources in E1  
Type of division of labor among 
processes 
Possession of human resources   
  Holding company Overseas subsidiary 
Maintaining markets and product 
planning 
○ × 
Engineers of product design ○ × 
Production and quality control 
engineers  
○ 
△ low-level 
engineers 
Skilled workers ○ △ 
Non-skilled workers △ ○ 
Source: Mizuno J. (2003)   
 
Comparing engineers at the overseas subsidiary and the holding company in 
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Table 4, there are many levels of engineers at the holding company, but there are no 
product planning engineers or product design engineers at the overseas subsidiary. 
The response is actually, “Yes, there are,” but in fact they are low-ranking engineers 
working in production and of quality control. When an engineer at a higher than 
intermediate level is necessary, E1’s system is to dispatch an engineer of this level 
comes from the holding company do teach the technique. In other words, in the case 
of E1, there is a supplementary relationship with regard to human resources between 
the holding company and overseas subsidiary, without duplication. In the holding 
company, high-level engineers are always ready to go and help engineers at the 
overseas subsidiary. 
It may be possible to state that this relationship creates a structure under which there 
is no hollowing out of engineers at the holding company. 
 
Table 5. Division of Labor among Processes and Human Resources in J1  
Type of division of labor among 
processes 
Possession of human resources   
  Holding company Overseas subsidiary 
Maintaining markets and product 
planning 
○ × 
Engineers of product design ○ × 
Production and quality control 
engineers  
○ 
△ Higher than 
intermediate level 
Skilled workers ○ ○△ 
Non-skilled workers △ ○ 
Source: same as table 4   
 
On the other hand, in the case of J1, as shown by Table 5, the holding 
company has all levels of engineers, from product planning and product design 
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engineers to non-skilled workers, just like E1. There are neither product planning nor 
product design engineers at J1, the overseas subsidiary, as with the case of E1. Unlike 
E1, however, the local production and quality control engineers at J1 are engineers 
who are above intermediate level (see Table 6). 
Table 6. Differences between E1 and J1  
  Ｅ１ Ｊ１ 
Capital investment ratio 100% Joint venture 
Products produced at overseas subsidiary Full line Partial 
Time required for technologies transfers  Short Long 
Local engineers educated at overseas 
subsidiary  
Low-level engineers
Higher than intermediate 
level 
Engineers at holding company 
Higher than 
intermediate level 
Higher than intermediate 
level 
 
Thus, there is redundancy with the engineers at the holding company. 
Even if there is a hollowing out of high-level engineers at the holding company, this 
does affect the overseas subsidiary. 
If the participation ratio of foreign capital in the joint enterprise is less than 49 
percent, the local side, which holds at least 51 percent, can increases its share and in 
practice divest itself from the foreign capital or develop into a rival company. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The result of our analysis of the first erroneous commonsense, that “European holding 
companies provide technologies, but Japanese holding companies are reluctant to do 
so,” is as follows. 
Whether the holding company transfers technologies or not depends on the 
investment form, i.e., whether it is a 100% subsidiary or a joint venture. We confirmed 
that actually, Japanese holding companies with 100% subsidiaries provided many 
more technologies than did European holding companies. 
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The result of our analysis of the second erroneous commonsense, that 
“European holding companies transfer technologies quickly, but Japanese ones slowly” 
is as follows. 
It does not take much time for technologies to be transferred to local 
subsidiaries from European holding companies, because the technologies that they 
transfer are low in grade, and the engineers that they train are low-ranking ones, who 
work according to a manual. In comparison, because Japanese holding companies 
foster mid-level skilled engineers, it takes time to transfer technologies. Because the 
local engineers trained by overseas subsidiaries of Japanese and European companies 
are different quality, it is expected that the system of the international division of 
labor will also be different. In fact, however, the form of the international division of 
labor is basically the same type, a division of labor among processes, in both Japanese 
and European companies. 
With regard to the division of labor of engineers between the holding company 
and a subsidiary, the European holding companies need to maintain higher-ranking 
engineers to provide assistance to the local low-level engineers as they advance into a 
multitude of countries. Under this structure, the holding company has to train its own 
senior engineers. 
In contrast, Japanese holding companies train engineers with a higher than 
intermediate level, even when they are joint venture forms and there is a possibility of 
leaks of technologies. In the case of J3, which is a fully-owned subsidiary of a 
Japanese company, the aim is to train engineers of the highest level. However, if local 
engineers are fostered to that level, they may end up overlapping with engineers at the 
holding company. In addition, if an engineer at an overseas affiliate of a Japanese 
company quits and finds a job in a competing company, that new company may develop 
into a rival. Furthermore, when the joint management contract expires, there is a 
danger that the local side will increase its capital ratio and become a rival as well. 
European holding companies insist on maintaining 100% investment in order 
to prevent leaks of technologies, and only train low-grade engineers at their overseas 
subsidiaries. These differences lead to employment effects and income effects, and in 
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turn to market (demand) creating effects. In addition, European holding companies 
develop supplementary relations, and as a result must train many high-level engineers 
to teach the local engineers as it advances abroad.  
The method of training engineers employed at overseas subsidiaries of 
Japanese companies, as outlined above, is similar to the method used in Japan, and it 
is thought that the technology transfers analyzed in this report are similar to those in 
the East and Southeast Asian region even though the industries are different. 
 
 
This report is part of an investigation carried out by the author while I was a 
visiting research fellow at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. The company visit 
investigation was carried out from September 2004 to September 2005. 
When conducting this investigation, I agreed not to release the names of individual 
companies. Therefore, the overseas subsidiaries of Japanese companies are described 
with the initial “J” substituting for the individual company name, and European 
subsidiaries are described with “E”s. 
I would like to take this opportunity to deeply thank the companies that provided 
cooperation with my investigation. I also thank Professor Fan Yong Min at Fudan 
University for his enormous assistance. In addition, I thank Emeritus Professor 
Yoshimi ITO of Tokyo Institute of Technology, Mr. Eiji KANIE, former superintendent 
in charge of elevator design at Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, and all others who 
helped me with this project.  
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